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The Stock Market’s Valuation of R&D and Market Concentration in 
Horizontal Mergers  
 
Abstract 
It is well documented that acquirers often pay a very large premium to acquire 
companies in related industries.   There are many explanations as to the source of this 
premium.  This study isolates two variables, R&D-intensity and market concentration, 
and correlates their value individually and jointly to the value of the acquired company.  
The results indicate that change in market concentration and R&D is positively correlated 
to the merger deal premium in a horizontal merger.    Furthermore, deal premiums tend to 
follow an inverted U curve pattern relative to market concentration change.  The study 
also shows that cost synergies and macro economic growth impact deal premium values. 
Key words:  mergers, R&D, market concentration, deal premium 






  A large body of research has examined the effect of mergers on the stock prices of 
acquisition targets and acquiring firms.  Study
2 results have consistently shown that acquisition 
candidates receive a large premium over market value to relinquish corporate control, while the 
market value of acquirers declines or remains the same.  These papers also assess the source (s) 
of the deal premium, focusing on a variety of factors including cost synergies, management 
effectiveness, market power, financing, R&D, etc.  While some authors, such as Higgins and 
Rodriguez (2006), have investigated the relationship between abnormal returns in a merger and 
R&D, there has been little research examining how change in market concentration and R&D 
intensity influence the perceived value of the merger. 
The relationship between innovation and market concentration has been explored in a 
variety of studies and theories dating back to Joseph Schumpeter (1950) and John Kenneth 
Galbraith (1957).  One hypothesis is that innovation increases with market concentration.  It has 
also been posited that the relationship between innovation and market structure may not be linear 
over the total range of market concentration.  A few researchers have promoted and sought to 
test the theory that innovation follows a U shape, with innovation reaching its apex at 
intermediate levels market of concentration with lower levels of innovation occurring at near 
monopoly and atomistic levels of competition (Wright, 2007).  It has also been argued that larger 
firms have innovation advantages over small firms due to economies of scale and scope in 
research, financing advantages, and knowledge complementarities.       
This paper examines whether acquirers pay more for acquisition candidates with higher 
levels of R&D.   The hypothesis is that R&D activity of a rival is worth more to an acquirer than 
                                                 




is indicated in the current value of the company.  The essay also explores whether acquirers pay 
more for acquisition candidates as market concentration increases.  This might be the case if 
companies are seeking to gain market share to increase pricing power and / or increase barriers to 
entry. 
To investigate these issues, I construct a data set of 112 horizontal mergers that 
occurred from 1997 to 2007.  These mergers were used as they all were issued 2nd requests by 
the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission for competition concerns
3, and 95 of 
these mergers were challenged by the government for concentration concerns.  To analyze the 
data, a model was developed that correlates the deal premium paid for the acquisition candidate 
to R&D intensity, market concentration, cost synergies
4, and other factors relating to the merger.   
The paper is organized as follows:  A literature review section covers merger research 
relating to R&D and market value, innovation and market concentration, and deal premiums.  
The next section covers the data set and provides a descriptive analysis of the merger data and 
variables examined in this paper.  A description of the models follows as well as an explanation 
of the econometric analysis employed to determine the effect of R&D, market concentration, and 
other covariates on the premiums paid for these mergers.  The paper concludes with the results, 
an analysis of findings, and conclusions and potential policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
There have been numerous studies
5 that examine the effect of R&D spending
6 and 
other intangibles (e.g. advertising) on market value.  Researchers continually find that both 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix for a list of mergers. 
 
4 These are claimed by the acquirers at the time of the merger announcement. 
5 For example, Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) and Ho, Key, and Ong (2005) 
 
6 R&D expenditures are expensed rather than capitalized per the 1974 FASB ruling, because, according to 




advertising and R&D expenditures have a consistent positive effect on the long term market 
value of the firm.  They speculate that “spending on advertising and R&D can be viewed as a 
form of investment in intangible assets with predictable positive effects on future cash flows. 
However, the valuation effects of advertising and R&D investment are most uniformly apparent 
in the case of large firms.” (Chauvin, 1993) 
The first and most widely cited paper that examined the relationship between R&D and 
stock market performance was Griliches’ 1981 study which found a positive correlation between 
the Tobin’s q of a firm and the level of R&D spending and patents applied.   Jaffe (1986) added 
to Griliches’ approach in that he modeled the market value of the firm relative to the current 
R&D intensity and R&D stock.  His regression results, which include factoring in spillover from 
R&D from other firms, indicated that investors placed a significantly larger emphasis on the 
value of R&D versus tangible assets.  He also finds that firms whose R&D activity is in areas 
where there is a lot of research by other firms have a higher return on R&D, whether measured in 
terms of accounting profits or market value.  Jaffe speculates that this result may be due to either 
a selection bias of studying only firms that report R&D or to the potential signaling that R&D 
spending conveys about long run returns. (Jaffe, 1986) 
Connelly and Hirschey (1984) also contributed to the literature in examining the 
correlation between R&D, market concentration and the value of the firm.  They theorize that a 
positive R&D-concentration interaction effect exists if R&D gives rise to sustainable proprietary 
advantage, while a negative R&D-concentration interaction effect would indicate that R&D may 
be especially difficult for joint profit maximizing oligopolistic firms to coordinate and thus 




appeared to support the negative interaction effect although they suggest that the result could be 
due to other reasons (e.g. firms in more concentrated industries are more efficient researchers). 
Hall (1988) performed a similar study when she correlated current and past R&D 
expenditures along with profits (as a proxy for market power) to a firm’s market value.  Her 
model included an R&D stock term, and an assumed depreciation rate of 15%.  Her findings 
reject this hypothesis, as she finds current R&D, but not past R&D, to be a significant indicator 
of firm value.  Hall (1993) later added to her analysis by examining the relative value of 
intangible versus tangible assets in firms over a 17 year period.  She finds that the market 
valuation changed over time in its valuation of tangible versus intangible assets, with intangible 
assets declining by a factor of 3 or 4 to overall value.   She provides a couple of explanations for 
this change to include the possibility that the returns to R&D declined or that R&D capital 
depreciated more rapidly in the later years studied.  Finally, she considers the possibility that the 
reduced valuation of R&D in the 1980s was due to waves of mergers and leveraged buyouts, 
particularly in the consumer products industries, whereby these companies’ market values were 
bid up.  Thus, if the market value of R&D assets had been driven down in the 1980s and early 
1990s, then it is possible that the increased premiums in this study that acquirers placed on R&D 
in horizontal mergers could be due to the depressed value of these R&D assets.  
Johnson and Pazderka (1993) follow Hall and others in their 1993 study in which they 
correlated market value to R&D and R&D stock, as well as a market power term and a firm’s 
book value.  They hypothesize that the market places a positive value on R&D expenses as a sign 
of future growth and profitability.  They develop a model that explains market value as a 
function of tangible assets, as measured by the firm’s book value (BV), and intangible factors to 




expenditures divided by book value, and 3) investment (INV) over the last year.  The market 
power term (E*) is defined as current profits minus a firm’s cost of equity capital.
7  Their model 
is the following: 
lnMV= β0 + β1lnBV + β2ln(E*/BV) +   β3(R&D/BV) + β4(INV/BV) +  Є                 (1)   
Johnson and Pazderka chose not to use patents as an explanatory variable, like 
Griliches and others
8 did, because previous studies (e.g. Griliches, 1988 and Hall, 1990) did not 
find patents to be significant in explaining market value, and they deem measuring the number of 
patents to be of dubious value.  Johnson and Pazderka found the coefficient of R&D intensity to 
be positive and significant to the 5% level.  They found mixed results in their market power and 
investment terms.    
There has been a lot written correlating a firm’s market value to its R&D activity, but 
few have studied the relationship between the abnormal returns in a merger and R&D activity.  
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) examine acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry from 1994 to 
2001.  They find evidence that acquirers realize significant positive returns on these acquisitions.  
They provide three explanations for their findings.  First, deteriorating R&D productivity could 
be the motivation underlying the acquisition of research-intensive firms.  The authors note that 
the late 1990s and early 2000s was a period in which drugs were very rapidly coming off patents.  
In response to their deteriorating patent-protected pipeline, pharmaceutical companies may have 
responded by making more acquisitions thus bidding up the acquisition prices.  Second, 
biopharmaceutical firms supplement internal R&D efforts through acquisitions.  This trend was 
particularly evident in the early 2000s as companies sought to fill drug pipelines and research 
gaps.  This merger wave, they claim, has bid up acquisition prices.  Third, acquirers can obtain 
                                                 
7 E*=NI – (k X BV), with NI being net income, k the cost of equity and BV the book value.  
 




significant additional information through pre-acquisition alliances with the target firm or 
alliances with firms conducting research that is similar to that of the potential target firm.  By 
obtaining this information, acquirers take out much of the risk inherent in an acquisition so they 
can more confidently offer a higher takeover price. 
 
2.1 Relationship between Innovation and Market Concentration 
The correlation of firm size to innovation and market concentration to innovation were 
first theorized by Schumpeter (1950) and Galbraith (1957).  The rationale behind the innovation-
firm size correlation, is 1) R&D projects involve large fixed costs that can only be covered if 
sales are sufficiently large (Syrneonidis, 1996), 2) Economies of scale and scope in the 
production of innovation are needed (Syrneonidis, 1996), 3) Capital market imperfections confer 
an advantage to large firms in securing financing for risky R&D projects (Cohen et al 1987), and 
4) R&D is more productive in large firms due to complementarities between R&D and other 
non-manufacturing activities (e.g. finance and marketing)   (Cohen et al 1987). 
In addition, Syrneonidis (1996) argues that innovative activity may be higher in 
concentrated industries because firms with greater market power can more easily garner the 
returns from innovation and thus have more incentive to innovative.  The argument is that 
patents become more valuable with greater market power.  In addition, he states, other 
mechanisms assuring appropriability, such as the secrecy, investment in marketing, learning by 
doing, and control of distribution channel all play a role in a firm with market power benefiting 
from innovation. 
The problems that Syrneonidis points out with the literature include:  1) assumptions 
that firm size and market structure are exogenous; recent work, he comments, points to 




control of industry effects, and 4) the implicit assumption that market concentration equals 
market power.   
 
2.2 Explanations of the Deal Premium 
Explanations of the deal premium vary significantly and include 1) efficiency gains, 2) 
increased market power, 3) management improvement, 4) supply and demand for the stock, and 
5) bidder’s pay too much.  Efficiency gains refer primarily to economies of scale, economies of 
scope, or other cost and/or marketing synergies.   Efficiencies can be divided into static and 
dynamic efficiencies.  Static efficiencies refer to improvements, such as economies of scale that 
occur once.  Dynamic efficiencies, according to the Secretariat of the European Competition 
Commission, enhance the ability or incentive to innovate.   “Learning by doing, eliminating 
redundant research and development expenditures, and economies of scale in R&D are examples 
of dynamic efficiencies.”  (OECD, 2007) 
Market power refers to a firm’s ability to influence price, quantity, and the nature of the 
product.  In turn, market power may lead to excess returns.  In related acquisitions, market power 
may be increased through product or market extension acquisitions (Montgomery, 1985). 
Premiums for management improvement in a merger stem from shifting business assets 
into the hands of managers who can generate more value from them, thanks to a greater ability or 
stronger incentives to maximize value (Slusky and Caves, 1991). 
In addition, deal premiums can arise simply because of the limited supply of stock in 
the company.  If the buyer is demanding a large percent of the stock then the forces of supply 
and demand will raise the stock market value.  According to Stout (1990), this has been an often 
overlooked factor, as most research has viewed the supply of stock to be perfectly elastic or that 




overlooked because it is contrary to the traditional capital asset pricing model.  “From the 
perspective of the buyer, the supply function for outstanding shares is upward sloping.  The 
takeover bidder who wishes to purchase the stock of a target firm from its current shareholders 
must offer a price that meets or exceeds the shareholders’ varying subjective estimates of value.  
Thus, purchasing larger amounts requires the bidder to offer higher and higher prices.”  (Stout, 
1990)  
Finally, it has been argued that there is a winner’s curse whereby bidders pay too much 
as evidenced by their below average post acquisition returns.  
There are a number of empirical studies relating to the determination of merger 
premiums.  The method employed in these studies is to regress certain factors, such as fit, 
financial leverage, management change, etc. against the deal premium  One example is Slusky 
and Caves’ (1991) study of 100 acquisitions in which they seek to identify the source of the 
acquisition premium using the following identity:    
PR = (BRES[Xi]/MV)B(Zi)   (2) 
PR in this equation refers to the one plus the deal premium or the ratio of the 
reservation price (BRES) paid by the successful acquirer divided by the market value of the firm.  
The reservation price depends on factors [Xi] that “predict the increase in cash flows due to 
combining the two firms’ assets.”  (Slusky and Caves, 1991)  Slusky and Caves further note that 
the B(*) is a bargaining function that “determines where the actual price falls between the 
reservation price of the would be acquirer (BRES) and the current owners (MV).” Zi are the 
determinants, such as the presence of competing bidders, affecting the bargaining function.  The 
authors find in their study measures of synergy and managerial effectiveness as the primary 





3. The Data Set 
The dataset for the dissertation includes 112 horizontal mergers that received second 
requests from the government per the Hart Scott Rodino (HSR) Act
9 from 1997 through 2007.   95 
of these mergers were challenged by the FTC or DOJ for violation of the Clayton Act Section VII 
b for excess concentration, which per the recent merger guidelines is a change in HHI >50 and/or a 
new HHI level >1,800.    
During this 11 year time period 742 2nd requests per the HSR Act were issued, and 440 
proposed mergers were publicly challenged by the Department of Justice and FTC (208 were 
publicly challenged by the Department of Justice and 232 were challenged by the FTC).     
“Challenged mergers” refer to mergers that are publicly challenged by the government after a HSR 
2nd request.  I use this data set, since it represents horizontal mergers that the government has 
determined to involve significant increases in market concentration
10. 
The following chart shows the number of 2
nd requests and challenged mergers that 
occurred from 1997 to 2007
11 per the HSR Act. 
 
Table 1:  Breakdown of 2
nd Requests and Merger Challenges  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
                                                 
9 The HSR Act requires specific filings for all mergers over a certain size threshold.  This amount, which 
is adjusted annually based on the change in the gross national product, is $65.2 million as of February, 2009. After 
receiving the initial filings, the government then has 30 days to request additional information if the transaction 
appears to present anti competitive problems.  The request for additional information is referred to as a 2
nd request 
and typically extends the waiting period an additional 30 days.  The government may then choose to allow the 
merger, seek injunctive relief, or negotiate a settlement that often involves disposition of key assets.  
 
10 Mergers involving private companies, product lines, or divisions of public companies could not be 
included because data was pulled from SEC filings.  In addition, I needed mergers that occurred fairly recently, 
because SEC filings become harder to gather the further back in time one goes. 
 




Typically, per the merger review process, approximately 1,750 to 2,000 mergers are 
reviewed a year.  Roughly 95% of the mergers are cleared during the 30 day waiting period as 
detailed in the HSR act and subsequent merger guidelines.  2nd requests are issued by the FTC 
and DOJ for the other 5% of mergers if the government believes there is a strong possibility that 
the transaction may be in violation of antitrust laws.  The parties then submit further 
documentation, and the government decides whether to challenge formally the merger.  When a 
merger is publicly challenged a complaint and / or competitive impact statement is issued.  These 
documents include evidence, such as market share, market concentration, and the definition of 
the contested market (See Appendix A for a list of challenged mergers used in this study). 
Mergers were deemed to have been challenged by the Federal Trade Commission or the 
Department of Justice if a complaint was filed in court or a press release was issued by either 
agency announcing that the transaction had been abandoned or restructured in response to the 
Department’s concerns.
12   In these cases a complaint and / or competitive impact statement is 
issued, which includes some of the evidence, such as market share, market concentration, and 
information concerning the relevant market behind the merger challenge. 
The data set also includes 17 mergers in which a 2nd request was issued, but the merger 
was not challenged.  Presumably, the mergers that were challenged would have resulted in higher 
market concentration than mergers that were not challenged.  However, some of the non-
challenged mergers would have resulted in very high market concentration as well.  Explanations 
as to why mergers with apparent high market concentration results were not challenged include 
1) the failed firm argument, in which one of the companies is no longer a competitive threat.  
This argument was used in the merger of McDonnell Douglas and Boeing, when the FTC 
                                                 





decided that “McDonnell Douglas, looking to the future, no longer constitutes a meaningful 
competitive force in the commercial aircraft market.”
13  A second argument is the efficiency 
defense, in which the government deems that the positive effects of merger specific cost savings 
outweighs the negative effects of potential price increases due to increased market concentration.  
This was a key reason why Whirlpool’s acquisition of Maytag was approved. 
The database is limited to mergers of standalone, public companies.  I chose this data 
set since I wanted recent mergers across many industries in which I could test how market 
concentration is influencing the deal premium.    Since these mergers were challenged, there is 
data available in the government merger impact statements regarding the levels of market 
concentration that result from the merger. 
I recognize the selection bias in using this data set that primarily covers high levels of 
market concentration; however, there is a significant range of market concentration in the data.   
Another problem with testing the effect of market concentration is that most of the firms have 
multiple products.  Therefore, I had to weight the change in concentration by the target 
company’s product sales as a percent of their total sales.
14 
The following table details each variable used in this study to determine the effect of 
R&D, market concentration, and other factors on the deal premium. 
 
                                                 
13 See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.shtm 





Table 2:  Variable Description 














The merger announcement date, deal size, and claimed cost synergies were gathered 
from press releases.  I then used the daily stock prices in the CRSP data base to determine the 
deal premium.    R&D intensities and profit margins were gathered from company financial 
reports.  The book value for Tobin’s q was gathered from company reports and the Compustat 
database.  Real economic growth rates were gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 





3.2 Deal Premiums 
Per Slusky and Caves’ (1991) technique, the premium is the difference between the 
adjusted deal price offered for the acquisition candidate and the market price, one month prior.  
The denominator is then the target’s stock price one month before the announcement.  The 
announcement date is the day in which the acquisition candidate received its first official bid.
15   
The adjusted deal price is the amount offered for the acquisition premium multiplied by (1- % 
change in the S&P).  By adjusting the deal price in this manner, the offer price is discounted to 
the 30 day prior level by the change in the S&P 500 index.   
I used the offered share price versus the actual stock market price in order to capture 
the amount that the firm is worth to the acquirer.  As such, this technique for calculating the deal 
premium does not take account investor reactions to the deal.  Often the stock price is lower than 
the offered price in the days after the announcement as investors fear the deal may not occur due 
to regulatory or financial concerns. 
In a few cases (e.g. Oracle-Peoplesoft and Boston Scientific-Guidant) the initial offer 
was rejected and later a second or third offer was accepted.  In these cases I calculate the deal 
premium as the percent change in stock price from the market value 30 days prior to the initial 
offer to the final offer, and subtract out the change in the S&P 500 during that longer period.  
The window in which the deal premium was calculated was three months in the case of Boston 
Scientific and six months in the case of Oracle.  I calculate the deal premium in this manner in 
order to capture the total amount the acquirer is paying for the deal. 
                                                 
15 In a few cases (e.g. Oracle acquiring Peoplesoft) the first bid was rejected and subsequently a higher bid 




The data set includes only acquisitions of one company by another.  I did not include 
equal mergers of two companies (e.g. Smithline Beecham / Glaxo and Conoco / Philips) as there 
no outright purchase so one cannot correlate factors to a purchase price or premium. 
3.3 Explanatory Variables 
R&D intensity is often used as a proxy for knowledge potential.  In this model, I use 
the average R&D intensity of the acquired firm for the two years prior to the merger.  R&D 
intensities were obtained from company financial statements.     
Deal size refers to the amount that is paid by the acquirer for the acquisition.  It is used 
as a control variable and an interactive variable with R&D to test for part of the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis.  A positive, significant coefficient for the interactive variable would support 
Schumpeter’s argument that size improves a company’s innovativeness. 
Change in HHI refers to the weighted average change in HHI for the acquired firm.  
This amount was calculated by taking the percent of a firm’s most recent annual sales that the 
product line (s) of concern for excess concentration represents and multiplying by the change in 
HHI as noted in the competitive impact statements or complaints.
16   In many cases the weighted 
average change in HHI included many product lines.  Mergers are challenged based on change in 
HHI and HHI levels.  I chose to use change in HHI as it more accurately reflects the incremental 
benefit that an acquirer might be gaining from the acquisition.   In addition, change in HHI is 
more readily available in the public documents than HHI level. 
Weighted average change in HHI in some of the mergers is difficult to calculate for a 
variety of reasons to include the following: 
                                                 
16 These documents list either the change in HHI, which is the product of the firms’ market shares, or the 




¾  Mergers were challenged for excess in concentration in the U.S., but the firm’s sales are 
global.  Thus, I assumed in some cases that the concentration levels in the U.S. applied 
globally as well.  In other cases I weighted change in HHI by U.S. sales. 
¾  In some cases (particularly with telecommunications mergers) the challenge was based 
on regional market shares and sales were not available for the region.  In these cases I 
estimated regional sales on customer base or population level. 
¾  Implicit in the weighted change in HHI technique is that the company’s product line 
sales that were not challenged result in zero change in market concentration from the 
merger.    Although this may often not be the case, the assumption is still valid because 
the government, who has supposedly sifted through the companies internal documents, 
has determined the other product lines do not constitute a threat to competition. 
Change in HHI is a key variable in a structural analysis of a merger’s impact on 
competition.   In merger analysis the government examines the unilateral and coordinated effects 
that are likely to occur.  Change in HHI is a key variable used to examine a merger’s likely 
coordinated effects, which antitrust agencies describe as the probability that firms in the market 
will successfully coordinate their behavior or strengthen existing coordination causing significant 
harm to the competition.  In conducting merger analysis, the agencies then examine both pre-
market conditions and the impact of the merger on these conditions.
17   (Ray) 
Net profit margins can indicate the target firm’s ability to price above marginal cost and 
thus shows its pricing power.   Large or increased net profit margins between the merger 
companies could indicate a firm’s ability to harm competition unilaterally.  Agencies look at the 
                                                 
17 The descriptions of coordinated effects in this paragraph and unilateral effects in the succeeding 
paragraph were taken from the Merger Working Group co-chaired by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust 
Division and the Irish Competition Authority as shown in Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hamilton LLP’s July 9, 2009 




potential for a horizontal merger to result in anti-competitive unilateral effects, or the likelihood 
that a merger will harm competition “by creating or enhancing the merged firm’s ability or 
incentives to exercise market power independently.”  (Ray) 
Economic growth refers to the real U.S. annual GDP growth.  This variable is used to 
control for macroeconomic effects under the assumption that the amount companies pay and 
perhaps more significantly the stock market value of the company are influenced by the 
macroeconomic environment, which is proxied by economic growth. 
I use the actual growth rates in the year after the merger announcement.  This variable 
then accounts for managers expectations of growth in the economy, which will influence the 
cash flows for the target company.   The next year economic growth is also used because many 
of the mergers occurred mid or even late in the year.      
I use Tobin’s q as a measure of how much investors are willing to pay for a company’s 
assets.  Tobin’s q relies on strict accounting of company book value and the market capitalization 
of the firm.  However, book value (the denominator of Tobin’s q) ignores the replacement costs 
of intangible assets, such as R&D and advertising (Carlton and Perloff, 1994).  As such, one 
might expect a high correlation between Tobin’s q and R&D intensity.  However, these two 
variables do not appear to have significant correlation in the mergers examined in this study (See 
Appendix C for the correlation matrix of variables).  A hypothesis regarding Tobin’s q is that it 
will be positively correlated with merger premiums indicating that acquirers are willing to pay 
more than the market value for control over intangible assets.   Alternatively, it might be 
negatively correlated with merger premiums suggesting that acquirers are seeking to purchase 
poorly managed companies.  Higher Tobin’s q amounts are often considered to indicate that 




Cost synergies reflect anticipated cost reductions that are identified by the acquirer to 
be achieved as a result of the merger.  This variable is self reported by the acquirer often as a 
justification for the merger.  I am using this variable as a means to test directly for the efficiency 
rationale for a merger. 
3.4 Merger Data by Industry 
Table 3:  Breakout of Mergers by Industry 







The majority of the mergers covered were in the manufacturing sector, with roughly 
20% to 25% of them being in the life sciences industry.  After life sciences the industries covered 
are well spread out between petroleum, high tech, chemical processing, consumer goods, 
aerospace, and services, particularly the tele-communications industry. 
There were merger waves in the petroleum (late 1990s) and life sciences (early 2000s) 
sectors that were included in this data set.  These merger waves do not appear to have influenced 
the premiums paid, as I did not find any discernable difference in the merger premiums from the 
beginning to the end of the merger wave. 
 
Table 4:  Average Merger Premiums by Industry 
Insert table 4 here 
As shown in the chart, challenged mergers appear to have a higher premium than non 
challenged mergers in each industry, except for life sciences.  However, since the data set 
included only a small number of mergers in which 2
nd requests were issued, but the merger was 





Table 5:  Premiums, R&D Intensity and Market Concentration among Challenged Mergers
18 
 






The high tech industry had the highest deal premium, R&D intensity and average 
weighted HHI.  In addition, the average deal size in the high tech industry was the lowest.   Life 
sciences had a below average deal premiums, high R&D intensity and lower HHI. 
 
4. Methodology 
The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between innovation (as 
proxied by R&D), market concentration, and the acquisition deal premium.  The primary 
hypothesis I am testing is whether R&D intensive acquisition candidates receive a larger deal 
premium.  In addition, I am testing whether the deal premium is positively impacted by increased 
market concentration resulting from the merger.    A positive answer to the first hypothesis 
supports the efficiency (static and dynamic) argument relative to R&D, while an affirmative 
answer to the second hypothesis provides evidence in support of the market power explanation 
for the deal premium 
In considering these hypotheses, I plot an average of deal premiums in the data set 
versus the weighted change in HHI for three R&D categories.   
                                                 
18 Only challenged mergers are included in this table, because data is not available for weighted change in 





Table 6:  Average Deal Premiums versus Change in HHI by R&D Class 
 
Insert graph here 
 
The graph appears to indicate that for weighted average change in HHI above 50 and 
lower than 250, the deal premiums are higher with a higher R&D intensity class.  Specifically, 
the deal premiums in the 50 to 250 change in HHI range are above the 34% average for 
challenged mergers in the R&D classes of 5% - 10% and >10%, but below the average deal 
premium in the R&D class <5%.  Above 250 weighted change in HHI, the results are mixed.    
 
4.1 Other Study Questions 
In addition to testing for how R&D and market concentration influence the deal 
premium, I also examine whether 1) the combination of higher R&D intensity and market 
concentration or 2) deal size and R&D intensity result in a larger premium.  In addition, I test 
whether the relationship between the two explanatory variables, R&D intensity and market 
concentration, and the deal premium differs depending on their level (e.g. low, medium, or high).   
If imperfect competition favors innovations, then one would expect a higher value to be placed 
on increased market concentration and R&D intensity.  Similarly, if larger firms are more 
innovative, then acquirers might pay more as firm size and R&D intensity increases. 
In addition, to these questions, I will examine whether the deal premiums vary 
significantly by industry.  Significant deal premiums in a sector might indicate industry-specific 






My approach is to investigate these patterns using econometric models that integrate 
Griliches (1984) and Johnson and Pazderka’s (1993) methods into Slusky and Caves’ (1991) 
model.  To do so, I will assess the effect of R&D intensity, weighted average market 
concentration, and profit margin (PM) on the deal premium (DP).   I will also include terms for 
cost synergy (Cost), Tobin’s q (Q), deal size (S), and economic growth (GRt+1).  The analytical 
framework for the study is based on Slusky and Caves’ structural equation presented earlier.   
To answer the questions posed, I present a series of models as follows:  1) Base and 
Interactive Model, 2) Industry and Merger Challenge Fixed Effects Models, and 3) HHI and 
R&D Segment Models.  The models were run for the 95 challenged mergers and all 112 mergers 
(challenged and non-challenged). 
It should be noted that there are likely other variables, such as financial leverage, that 
affect the deal premium, but are not related to the questions of interest.  The omission of these 
other variables is not likely to bias the other coefficients in the results as they do not appear to be 
correlated with the included explanatory variables.   
Also, these models are reduced form equations.  As such, I tested the models using a 
number of specifications
19 that are relevant to the study questions and chose equations 2.5 and 
2.6 listed below as the primary models because they provided the best fit.  I recognize that results 
may be sensitive to specifications.  I investigated a number of specifications and found most of 
the results to be qualitatively similar to the ones reported. 
 
                                                 
19 I tested a number of interaction terms including (profit*log ΔHHI), (profit*log deal size), (log ΔHHI*log deal 
size), and (log R&D*profit).  None of the interactive terms were found to be significant.  In addition, I tested a linear 
versus log specification for both the base and interactive models and found a better fit when transforming the 




Model 1:  Base Model 
 
lnDPi= β1 + β2lnCostm + β3lnSi + β4PMi + βln∆HHIm+ β6lnRi + β7lnQi + β8lnGRt+1 + Єi                (3) 
In this equation, i refers to the acquisition candidate, and m indexes the merger.  (See 
table 2 for a reference of variables)   The variables were expressed in logs for all covariates 
except for profit margin to assess a non-linear relationship.  Average profit margins were left in 
levels because approximately a third of the margins were negative. 
Change in HHI variable is only available for challenged mergers.  In order to compare 
results between challenged and all mergers, the base model was run both for challenged (95) and 
all mergers (112) without the change in HHI term.  The results are presented in table 8. 
To test the interaction between R&D intensity, change in market concentration, and 
deal size, I developed a second model that adds interactive terms (lnR*ln∆HHI) and (lnR*lnS) to 
Model 1.    This model was run for the challenged merger sample and also for the full sample, 
with a challenge dummy included and change in HHI dropped. 
 
Model 2:  Interactive Model 
 
lnDPi= β1 + β2lnCostm+ β3lnSIZEi + β4PMi + β5ln∆HHIm+β6lnRi + β7lnQi + β8lnGRt+1             
          
+ β9(lnR*ln∆HHI) +  β10(lnR*lnS) + Є            (4) 
Industry Models 
Mergers in the data set were classified into 10 different industries.  These industries 
may have specific characteristics during the time frame under consideration that would cause the 
deal premium to be higher or lower than average.  As such, I ran a regression using fixed effects 




second regression adding the fixed effects to model 2.5 to assess how the covariates along with 
the industry affect the deal premium. 
In addition, I extended the base model to assess the effect of the merger challenge on 
the deal premium.  I did this by running another regression using a dummy variable for the 
merger challenge, and an interactive term of the merger challenge dummy variable with R&D to 
see if the effect of R&D is any different in challenged versus non challenged mergers. 
 
HHI and R&D Segments 
The purpose of these models is to look at different segments (low, medium, and high 
concentration) of market concentration and R&D to assess the sign and significance of the effect 
of these segments on the deal premium.  To do so, I classified weighted change in HHI and 
R&D-intensity into low, medium, and high ranges as follows: 
 
 
Table 7:  Change in HHI and R&D-Intensity Classes 
 
Insert table 7 here 
 
I then added dummy variables to equation 2.5 to assess the effect that each of the six 
segments has on the deal premium along with the other covariates.  In addition, I ran a second 
regression to assess the impact of interacting each of the three R&D segments with each of the 
three changes in HHI segments.  In the model I drop two of the segments; the coefficients for 






Table 8:  Base and Interactive Model Results 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Insert table 8 here 
 
The coefficient for change in HHI in logs is positive and significant at the 1% level in 
the base model.  The coefficient (.15) of log change in HHI also explains a large amount of the 
deal premium.  A positive, significant coefficient for log weighted change in HHI in the base 
model would appear to indicate that companies are paying more to gain market power via 
increased market concentration.  This finding lends support to the structural method of 
evaluating mergers, as companies are motivated to acquire companies for gains in market share.   
The coefficient for log cost synergy is positive and significant in each of the models.  
This finding supports the notion that companies consider the potential cost synergies in their 
acquisition price.  This finding has important policy implications as it shows that acquirers 
engage in horizontal mergers not only to gain market share but also to take advantage of cost 
synergies. 
The coefficient of growth one year in the future is significant and negative in both the 
base and interactive models.  This finding might be due to lower market values of the acquisition 
candidates prior to the merger announcement as the economy slows.  A possible explanation for 
the negative coefficient on growth is that acquirers have a longer term time horizon when 
considering the potential value of the firm than do investors.       
I tested the macro growth rate for the current year and the next year and found only the 
next year to be significant.  It is reasonable that the next period growth rate would be significant 




The coefficient for log R&D is positive in all models and significant in the base model 
and the interactive model for both challenged and non-challenged mergers.  The coefficient of 
log R&D also appears to be fairly large (.10 in the base and .15 in the second interactive model) 
relative to the other coefficients.     
These findings are particularly relevant since these mergers are all horizontal mergers 
that received 2nd requests with the majority of the mergers being challenged for excess 
concentration.  These results would seem to show that companies are paying higher premiums 
for firms with higher R&D intensity in concentrated industries.  However, it is also noteworthy 
that the coefficient for log R&D in the first interactive model is insignificant and small.   It 
appears from these findings that R&D intensity impacts the deal premium only when change in 
HHI or the deal size interacted with R&D intensity is considered.    
The coefficient for the interactive term (lnR*lnS) is negative in the interactive model of 
challenged mergers and significant to the 10% level.  The coefficient of the interactive term is 
also negative when including all mergers but not quite significant.  It is surprising that the 
coefficient for (lnR*lnS) is negative since the coefficient for log R&D is positive and significant.  
It appears to contradict the hypothesis that an acquisition candidate is worth more the larger its 
size and R&D intensity.  In fact, given that the term is significant and negative it would indicate 
the opposite.   This result, however, is very likely skewed because high tech industries have a 
very large premium (average of 89%), high R&D-intensity, but small deal sizes.  As such, some 
of the results do not appear to generalize outside of one or a few industries.  
(lnR * ln∆HHI) is not significant, which appears to contradict the hypothesis that firms 
are paying more for the combination of R&D intensity and market concentration.   We have to 




the range of R&D intensity that is significant when combined with change in HHI and the range 
of HHI change that is significant when combined with R&D-intensity. 
Finally, the coefficient for the challenge merger dummy is not significant in either the 
base or interactive models. 
 















The first regression (Industry model) shows the results when regressing each of the 
industries to the deal premium, while the second regression (Industry 2) adds the other covariates 
from the base model.  From the Industry model regression we see the effect of being in a specific 
industry if none of the other factors are considered.  The results show the coefficient for the high 
tech industry to be positive, significant to the 1% level, and very large.   The positive coefficient 
for the high tech industry may be due to the timing of the data set from 1997 to 2007, which includes 
the high tech bubble and bust.  We also see the coefficients for general manufacturing industry to 
be positive in each of the models.  This might indicate that market share is of greater value to an 
acquirer in the general manufacturing industry than other industries, perhaps due to barriers to 
entry from economies of scale.  Finally, we see the coefficients for the aerospace, food, 
chemical, and health care industry positive and significant in the first model, but not significant 




The fit is the best in the second regression.  The results from this model indicate that 
R&D intensity and change in HHI are significant in their influence on the deal premium in 
addition to being in the high tech and general manufacturing industry.   
The third model differs slightly from the second model in that it includes all mergers.  
The model has a dummy variable for the merger challenge and excludes change in HHI, since 
non-challenged mergers are included.  The fit in the third regression is worse than the second 
one, most likely because change in HHI is not included.  In the third regression, the coefficients 
for mining and aerospace become significant in addition to the coefficients for high tech and 
general manufacturing.  It appears that as change in HHI is dropped from the model, acquirers 
primarily consider the industry and cost synergies in determining the deal premium.      
 
HHI and R&D Segments 
The next model examines the regions of R&D and change in HHI that are significant in 
determining the deal premium.  In doing so, I break down the weighted change in HHI and 
R&D-intensity into three segments each (nine in total) to approximate low, medium, and high.    
The following chart shows the average premiums by segment. 
Table 10:  Average Deal Premiums by Market Concentration and R&D Segments 
 
Insert table 10 here 
 
It is interesting to note that deal premiums are the highest in the middle and high range 
of market concentration irrespective of R&D intensity.  The one outlier is 73% deal premium for 
high R&D intensity and medium levels of market concentration.  The results from the following 
regressions show the sign and significance of separate R&D and ∆HHI segments as well as 





Table 11:  Regression Results – Fixed and Combination Segments 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Insert table 11 here 
 
 
I find in the fixed segment model that the deal premium in the middle change in HHI 
range (100-250) is 48% higher than the high (>250) change in HHI range.  The coefficient for 
the low (<100) change in HHI range is also positive but not significant.  Therefore, the results 
show that not only does the change in HHI have a positive effect on the deal premium, and but 
also that companies will pay the most for acquisition candidates when the change in market 
concentration is in the middle range.   
From the fixed segment model we also see that log R&D has a positive effect on the 
deal premium.  However, it is unclear whether any R&D segment has a larger effect on the deal 
premium than another segment as neither of the R&D segment coefficients is significant. 
In the combination segment model, I combine R&D segments with the range of change 
in HHI, and combine change in HHI segments with the range of R&D.  I find the middle ∆HHI 
combined with R&D to have the highest deal premium (25% higher than the low segment), and 
the deal premium in the high ∆HHI combined with R&D to be positive but not quite significant 
in comparison to the low segment.    
I also find significant differences in the R&D segments combined with change in HHI.  
Here, the middle R&D range and high R&D range each combined with change in HHI results in 




HHI.  This result again is counter to the notion that the deal premium is an increasing function of 
R&D intensity combined with change in market concentration. 
6. Summary 
There have been many studies that have found a positive correlation between R&D 
investment and market value.  This study considers how an acquirer values a firm in a horizontal 
merger.  In particular, I focus on the value acquirers place on R&D intensity and market 
concentration versus other factors.  The study indicates that there is a high correlation between 
the amount acquirers pay in effectuating a horizontal acquisition and cost synergies, the R&D 
intensity of the acquired firm, and the resulting market concentration that ensues from the 
merger.  R&D intensity, however, only impacts the deal premium when it is consider along with 
change in market concentration or is interacted with deal size.  These results could be interpreted 
as lending support for the Schumpeterian theory
20 since if firms are paying more for R&D 
intensity and change in market concentration then there is incremental value to the acquirer when 
both factors exist.  However, when R&D intensity is combined with market concentration the 
interactive term is not significant while R&D intensity when combined with deal size is 
negatively correlated to the deal premium.    Both findings appear to counter the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis. 
To further explore this issue, I separate the range of market concentration change and 
R&D-intensity into distinct segments.  In doing so, I find significant positive correlation between 
mid and high levels of market concentration and the deal premium.  In addition, I find that 
acquirers appear to value acquisition candidates the highest at mid levels of market concentration 
change when combined with R&D and slightly less at high levels of market concentration 
                                                 
20 The study does not directly tie to Schumpeter’s hypothesis because it tests for the significance of change 






change when combined with R&D.  Deal premiums are the lowest at low levels of market 
concentration change when combined with R&D. 
The results also show that macro economic conditions effect the deal premium as 
higher premiums are paid in times of expected future low economic growth.   In addition, I find 
in some cases the industry affects the value of the deal premium.  In particular, deal premiums 
are higher in the high tech industry and the general manufacturing industry.   
There are a few policy implications to consider from this study.  First, it does appear 
that change in HHI is relevant in viewing the potential pricing power that can result from a 
merger since firms will pay a larger premium for mergers that result in higher changes in HHI.  
Second, R&D-intensity is also a very important factor to consider, particularly when combined 
with mid to high levels of market concentration.  Acquirers appear especially interested in 
acquiring companies that provide a unique mix of R&D intensity and increased market share in 
order to gain monopoly positions.  It is this mix, I believe, that facilitates the acquirer’s ability to 
monetize R&D efforts and, therefore, gain a sustainable competitive advantage. 
While this paper has provided evidence of the significant role that market concentration 
and R&D intensity play in affecting the values placed on horizontal merger candidates, it does 
not explain the effect on innovation that results from these mergers.  It is left to future research to 
assess the impact of R&D intensity that results from horizontal mergers. 30 
 
APPENDIX A 
LISTING OF CHALLENGED MERGERS – ANALYSIS OF PREMIUMS 
Acquirer / 




















Industry  39% .2  3.9  5.8  1150  .1% 
Shell - 
















Sciences  22% 0  4.5  1.0  123  20% 
Boston Sc. - 
Guidant 
Life 













Sciences  30% 2.0  4.7 58  109.29  18% 
Teva-IVAX  Life 





Consumer  18% 1.0  24.8 57 13  2.08% 
Valero-



























Mobil  Petroleum 32%  3.0  3.9  73.7  50  .44% 
BP-Amoco Petroleum  25%  2.0  3.5  48.5  21  .6% 
BP Amoco - 




Industry  43% .40  1.9 2.6  4,792  1.46% 
Valero-




Sciences  30% 2.100  13.8  112.5 38  8.59% 
Valspar - 
Lilly  Chemical 65%  .095  3.8  .762  625  3% 
JDSU-Etek  High 
Tech  56% .200  38.2  13.5  288 10% 
Dow-














Sciences  7.4% 1.2  10.9 70  40.43 




Chemical 3%  0.4  3.7  22  920  8.74% 
Penn-
Argosy  Services  16% 0.0  5.1 2.2 410 0% 
GE-Invision  Life 
Sciences  21% 0.0  2.5 .9 161  2.00 
Philips-
Conoco  Petroleum 07%  0.8  2.0  35  907  0% 
Dow –Union 
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Industry  -2% .053 4.15 7.4 261 1.0 
SBC-
Ameritech  Services  32% .1285  5.52  62  106  1.0 







































Chemical  22%  0  8.42  2.3  44  13.0 
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Industry  55%  .070  6.43  11  836  1.0 
Verizon-




Industry  21%  .09  1.80  4.7  522  0.2 
Worldcom-
Intermedia  Telecom  38%  0  9.53  6  68  1.1 
Worldcom-
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Industry  24%  .023  2.18  2.4  413  0.0 
Barr-Pliva  Life 
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50%  .1  1.21  2.5  190  4.3 
Monsanto – 
Pine Land  chemical  20%  0  7.32  1.5  1930  2.8 
Excelon-
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care  18.5%  0  135.7  2.25  629  0.0 
Northwest-




care  26.5%  .02  2.36  .016  1912  0.0 
Commscope 
- Andrew  Service  17.6%  0  1.44  2.6  322  5.2 
Capital-
Triathlon  Service  14.8%  .178  2.8  0.19  152  0.0 
AT&T - 

















20.5%  .038  15.45  2.7  30.6  0.7 
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54%  .06  .816  .568  398  0.0 
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Wellpoint  Healthcare 35%  .239    3.02  14.2  0% 
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Science  17%  0 3.82  0.4 16.0% 
J&J Alza  Life 
Science  39%  0 7.17  21 6.1 
Valero - 
premcor  Petroleum 23%  .044  8.6  8  .9% 
Whirlpool - 
maytag  Industrial 43%  .219  1.33  2.6  1.5% 
Arch wireless
- Metrocall  Telecom 5%  .165  1.53  .3  0% 
Worldcom 
MCI  Telecom 21%  .032  3.4  44  0% 
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Panamsat  Service 23%  .04  20.0  3.2  0% 
Ebay - 
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Table 1:  Breakdown of 2
nd Requests and Merger Challenges  
 
Type  DOJ  FTC  Total 
Merger Challenges  232  208  440 
2





Table 2:  Variable Description 
Variable (s) 
  Symbol  Description  Purpose 
Deal Premium   DPi 
DP = (Sm*(1-%∆S&P )–MV)  
                            MV 
S  = deal value at time of merger 
announcement  
MV = market value 30 days 
prior to the merger 
Shows the additional 
amount the acquirer will 
pay for the acquisition 
above market price 
Deal size  Sm  Purchase price of target firm 
Variable to calculate 
market value and create an 
interaction term with R&D 
 Average R&D 
intensity   Ri 
R&D as a percent of sales of the 
acquisition candidate for recent 
year prior to merger 
A measure of the 




Herfindahl Index  
∆HHIm 
Change in HHI multiplied by the 
percentage of the challenged 
product revenue by total company 
sales  
Shows the increase in 
market concentration from 
the merger.  
Profit margin  PMi   Average of target firm’s profit 
margin for previous two years 
Measure of ability to price 
above marginal costs and 
earn abnormal profits 
Tobin’s q   qi 
Market value divided by the 
stockholder’s equity of the 
acquisition candidate.   
A measure of intrinsic 
value or the value of the 
company to the market.  It 
is often viewed as a 
measure of managerial 
performance.  
Cost Synergy 
divided by Market 
Value 
COSTi 
Claimed annual merger specific 
cost synergies.  This variable is 
normalized by dividing by market 
value 
Shows the expected 
efficiencies from the 
horizontal merger 
Economic Growth  GRt+1  Annual GDP growth one year after 
the deal is announced 
Measure of expected 
economic growth, which is 
used to determine if 





Table 3:  Breakout of Mergers by Industry 
Industry  Primary  
NAICS Code (s) 
Frequency  -  
Challenged Mergers  
Frequency  - 
Total Mergers





Various  10 15 
Life sciences  325411,    22   24 
Food and consumer   311111, 325611   6   6 
High tech  334111, 334611   6   6 
Mining, metals, and 
minerals 
33111, 212111   4   5 
Chemical processing  325110,   5   6 
Aerospace / Defense  336411,   5   6 
Telecommunications  517110   14   18 
Health care  524111  10  10 
Other services
22
  Various   5   8 
Total   95 112 
 
                                                 
21 General manufacturing includes automotive, appliances, paints, and building products. 
22 Other services include movie theaters, gaming, airlines, newspapers, financial processing, 
supermarkets, and utilities. 
 45 
 




Premiums  - 
All Mergers 
Average Merger 




Premiums  -  
Non Challenged 
Mergers 
Petroleum 27%  27%  23% 
General manufacturing  50%  50%  48% 
Life sciences   31%   30%  49% 
Food and consumer    40%   40%  - 
High tech   89%   89%  - 
Mining, metals, and 
minerals   28%   29%  25% 
Chemical processing   31%   33%  22% 
Aerospace / Defense   35%   37%  22% 
Telecommunications   28%   32%  18% 
Health care  21%  21%  - 
Other services   22%   27%  23% 




















Petroleum 27%  $27.2  0.8%  170 
General 
manufacturing  50% $7.0  1.8% 349 
Life sciences   30%  $14.9   12.1%  250 
Food and consumer    40%  $12.1  1.8%  188 
High tech   89%  $4.7   14.4%  778 
Mining, metals, and 
minerals   29%  $13.5   0.9%  200 
Chemical processing   33%  $4.3   5.9%  532 
Aerospace / Defense   37%  $7.2   2.7%  550 
Telecommunications   32%  $26.8   0.8%  265 
Health care  21%  $5.8  0.0%  239 
Other services   27%  $5.9  0.0%  312 
Average  35%  $13.4  4.4% 317 
 
 
                                                 
23 Only challenged mergers are included in this table, because data is not available for weighted 
change in HHI for the non-challenged merger. 
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R&D of 5% to 10%
R&D of 0% to 5%
 
 
Table 7:  Change in HHI and R&D-Intensity Classes 
Category  Weighted Change in 
HHI 
R&D-Intensity 
Low  0 - 50  0% - 5% 
Mid  51 - 250  5% - 10% 




Table 8:  Base and Interactive Model Results 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 

































Log ∆HHI  .15*** 
(2.90)  - -    .15** 




(1.70)    
0.08** 
(2.08)    
0.09** 
(2.17)    
  0.07 






























































Challenge       .15 
(.67) 





-  -  - 









-  -  - 
   .01 
(.29)  -  - 












R2  .21  .14  .12    .23  .16  .13 
N  95  95  112    95  95  112 






Table 9:  Regression Results –Industry Effects 
(t statistics) 
Log Deal Premium  Industry Model  Industry and 
Base Model  All Mergers 














Life sciences  .31 
(1.59)    
.72 
(.10)    
.06 
(.23)    




















































Log HHI  -  .11* 
(1.92)  - 













Challenge  -  -  .21 
(.99) 






R2  .22  .33  .28 
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Table 10:  Average Deal Premiums by Market Concentration and R&D Segments 
Weighted 
Change in HHI 
R&D <5% 
(Low) 
R&D 5% - 10%
(Mid) 
R&D > 10% 
(High) 
Total 
0-50 (Low)  18%  15%  23%  19% 
51-250 (Mid)  37%  35%  73%  39% 
> 250 (High)  33%  43%  44%  37% 





Table 11:  Regression Results – Fixed and Combination Segments 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 












Log Cost Synergy  .04 
(1.24)    
.07* 
(1.66)    
















Low R&D (<5% )  .42 
(1.50)  - 
Mid R&D (5% - 10%)   -.09 
(-.42)  - 
Low ∆HHI (<100)  .34 
(.74)  - 
Mid ∆HHI (100-250)  .48** 
(2.09)   - 
Mid ∆HHI (100-250)* log 
R&D  -  .25*** 
(2.34) 
High ∆HHI (>250)* log ∆ 
R&D  -  .18 
(1.62) 
Mid R&D (5% - 10%)  
* log ∆HHI  -  -.10*** 
(-2.48) 
High R&D (>10%)  * log 
∆HHI  -  -.09* 
(-1.85) 




R2  .32  .28 
N  95  95 
 
 